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Studies in the Estimation of Elasticities
of U.S. Army Recruit Production Factors
C. M. Keller, H. J. Larson, R. R. Read
Naval Postgraduate School
Executive Summary
The United States military recruiting commands are tasked with providing new recruits in
sufficient numbers, of the correct types, to maintain the national defense. To accomplish this
they are authorized by Congress to advertise and to offer certain incentives to attract eligible
persons into the required billets. These programs involve costs and, with increasingly severe
budget restrictions, it is important that the dollars available be spent in the best possible
manner. A number of fairly recent studies have attempted to estimate the relative effects of
advertising and various other incentives on the production of enlisted contracts. This paper
discusses some issues involved in such estimation, reviews the data used in one recent study,
and employs this data to estimate several alternative models of contract production. Recom-
mendations are made about collecting and maintaining accurate data for the investigation
of tradeoffs of resource allocations.
I. Background
The discontinuance of the draft placed the armed services in a new posture relative to
the acquisition of labor. The requirement for quality recruits at reasonable cost led to the
formalized study of the appropriate labor supply, the ability to tap that supply in adequate
numbers, and the measurement of the job performance of those that join the services [16].
The present study is follow on work to that found in [4], which deals with the issues of
acquiring high quality recruits in a timely fashion and at reasonable costs.
For recruiting purposes, high quality recruits are defined as males in the 17-21 age
group who either are high school seniors or graduates and have scored well on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT, categories I-IIIa). The Army is allowed to offer a number
of incentives to help in the acquisition of recruits (especially the high quality recruits); these
currently include monetary incentives (bonuses) of various types, support for attending
college after service and the repayment of previously contracted college loans. In addition,
the Army is allowed funds for various advertising efforts and for experienced recruiters
to make personal contact with prospective enlistees. These factors are used in measured
degrees to aid the achievement of the current goals (also called missions or quotas), set by
the Department of the Army, for recruits in the various specialties and to overcome the
offsetting effects of the economy and competing opportunities in the civilian world.
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Reference [20] contains modeling appropriate to the relations between the inputs and
outputs of this process, utilizing the elasticities of the high quality recruits with respect
to the several variables at the disposal of the recruiting commands. Thus the estimation
and temporal stability of these elasticities is an important issue in this process. The effects
of uncontrollable factors, such as unemployment, competing civilian wages, and social at-
titudes, need to be accounted for (or removed from) the estimation of these elasticities to
the greatest extent possible.
The present report deals with econometric modeling and the estimation of elasticities.
More specifically the work of Berner &: Daula [4] has been specified as a point of depar-
ture. They have graciously shared the data used in their report for this effort. The model
structure presented in their report has been altered, the techniques of specific model de-
velopment have been enhanced, and more recent data are being gathered to investigate
possible changes to the elasticities required to use the structure of [20]. In this regard, new
data on the numbers of recruits contracted and on the various benefits available to them
for the latter part of the period covered by the Berner & Daula data is currently available.
These values have been used, for this shorter time period, to re-estimate several elasticities
of interest, using a model from the recent econometric literature which allows for varying
efficiency levels among groups (battalions for our application).
Our original intent was to gather more recent data than that used in [4], and to explore
various models for estimating elasticities of interest using these later data values. The
modelling was to employ the same variables as those used in [4], to the extent possible, to
provide comparability with earlier efforts. The data gathering process has proved extremely
time consuming and has not yet been completed. In the interim, necessary computer
programming to implement the models chosen has been completed.
The data currently available are briefly described in Section II, and the structures of
the new classes of models is also presented there. Some numerical results are presented in
Section III, derived in part or in whole from the historical data set provided by Berner &:
Daula. Section IV contains some conclusions and is followed by an appendix that contains
details and idiosyncrasies that may be useful to others interested in modelling in this area.
II. Data available and Structure of Models
The data set used in [4] contained monthly data on all of the Army's recruiting bat-
talions (originally 56 in number, dropping to 55 during the period) for the time span from
fiscal year 1981 (starting in October, 1980) through December, 1989 (the first three months
of fiscal year 1990). The values of many variables were given; these include the numbers of
high and low quality contracts produced, the goals for these types of contracts which the
Army wanted to meet, the delayed entry program (DEP) losses which occurred, and money
spent on advertising (of several types). In addition, the values for many incentive variables
were given (bonuses, Army college fund), the values for basic military compensation were
given, as well as estimates of the competing civilian wage; also included were indicators of
the size of the eligible population (for recruiting), numbers of recruiters and indicators of
how experienced they were, measures of the youth attitude toward the military as a career,
and estimated unemployment rates. Some of these variables changed values monthly, some
quarterly or less frequently, and some only annually. Similarly, some of them are constant
across battalions and others vary with battalion. A more complete description of this data
set, and some of its apparent weaknesses, is given in the Appendix.
In addition to the historical data set provided by Berner &: Daula, the United States
Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) has provided data on the numbers of enlisted
contracts written and details of various benefit packages offered (primarily bonuses and
future educational benefits) from fiscal year 1988 through fiscal year 1994. This period
overlaps the final 27 months covered by the Berner & Daula data set; the USAREC data
on contract production is in fair agreement with the values used by Berner &: Daula for
the same period. The USAREC data on benefits offered during this overlap period is
considerably more detailed than the historical data and is not in apparent agreement with
the values used in [4]. This fact would be expected to have a major impact on the estimated
elasticities for such benefits. Unfortunately, it has not yet proved possible to get reliable
later data on all the other variables used in the Berner & Daula study, so a complete study
utilizing the same variables as [4] with more recent data is not currently feasible. However,
Daula has proposed a different model for estimating the same elasticities; this suggestion has
been investigated using the historical data set. In addition, a model proposed by Cornwell,
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Schmidt and Sickles [6], an approach also recommended by Daula, has been investigated
using the USAREC data on contracts and benefits, together with the historic data on other
variables for the 27 months of overlap between the data sets.
The utility function introduced by Polich, Dertouzos, and Press [20] serves at the heart
of the modeling used by Berner & Daula. They developed a multi-equation econometric
system as a result of optimizing this utility function for each time period (month) of obser-
vation. The results of their system, coupled with a three regime partitioning, were reported
in [4j. More recently, Daula has developed optimization equations for this utility function
based upon a time window of several months or more. The result of his derivation has led
to autoregressive modeling and is presented below.
In what follows, Ht represents the number of high quality contracts signed in period
(month or quarter) t, QHt represents the high quality goal for period t, Lt represents the
number of low quality contracts (anything other than high), and X\ <t represents the collec-
tion of exogenous variables used (unemployment rate, military compensation, civilian wage
rate, various benefits available, qualified persons available in the market to be recruited,
etc.) in period t. The variables Ht,QHt} Lt were treated as being endogenous in [4]; Daula
suggested maintaining this assumption with the newly specified model.
The basic equation which Daula suggested should be estimated from observed data is
00




A t _j = Mnift-j -62 inLt -j - X^t-jSz -S4 [nQHt -j - fahaQHt+i-j.
Note that this basic equation involves both positive (backward in time) and negative (for-
ward in time) lags. It could be that a4 = (high quality contracts in period t do not depend
on those in period t + 1) or a5 = (no dependence on the goal in the following period) or
both. These hypotheses could be tested using the observed data. This basic equation also
employs infinite lags into the past, which of course is not feasibly estimable.
Daula further suggested this model be simplified by dropping all terms with j > 2.
This then states that the log of the number of high quality contracts to be produced in
period t is a function of the low quality contract production in the current period and the
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one preceding, as well as the high goal in the preceding, current and succeeding periods,
the number of high quality contracts in the preceding and succeeding periods, as well as
the current value of any exogenous variables used (incentives, military and civilian pay,
unemployment, youth attitudes, lagged endogenous variables, and so on).
To help control for battalion specific effects, the logs of all variables (except dummies)
were computed and then centered at their battalion means (difference between the log and
the grand mean of the logs over the full span of time). Simple two-stage least squares
was suggested as the basic procedure to employ in estimating the unknown coefficients in
the model. As has been mentioned, Berner & Daula used monthly data in [4] with their
three-regime approach; this new equation was also estimated with monthly data, giving
estimates which were not very stable (the estimated coefficients could change quite drasti-
cally if certain variables were added or deleted). Kearl and Schmitz [17] are experienced in
modelling with this type of data and suggested that more stable results might be expected
with quarterly data. This point has been investigated by aggregating the monthly data
into quarterly values; the same model (employing the same exogenous variables) is more
stable with the quarterly values from this historical data set. Schmitz [22] also suggested
that the historic data set values for the bonus variables and educational benefits did not
appear to match the values contained in an earlier report. He has provided the alternative
(annual) values for these variables.
Some numerical results produced by this new model are presented in the next section.
As with results quoted in [4], some of the elasticities produced have incorrect signs, even
with quarterly data values; this is probably caused by the quality of the data itself. (See
the appendix for a discussion of this historical data set.)
The approach taken by Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles [6] includes the possibility of
differing efficiency levels for the different battalions; this is done by essentially adopting
a separate "y-mtercept" for the various battalions which is a polynomial function of t,
the time period (the same order is used for all battalions). The variables to be modelled
are projected into the space orthogonal to such a polynomial intercept, then regular least
squares regression is applied to estimate the unknown coefficients; finally, the residuals
of this regression then are regressed on the desired polynomial function, providing the
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estimates for the individual battalion y-intercepts.
This type of model has been investigated using the final 27 months of data for some
of the historical data values used in [4]; the numbers of high and low contracts produced
were those provided by USAREC. The data describing benefits offered (see Appendix for a
description of their construction) were computed from the recently supplied USAREC data
in the same spirit used by [4].
The historical data set included several variables describing enlistment bonuses:
BONUS - Weighted average of the fraction of enlistees eligible for a bonus times
the value of the bonus, where the weights were based on the average
fractions of three year (.512) and four year (.412) enlistments over the
full time span; adjusted by the CPI to 1990 dollars
AVGBONUS - Weighted average of the three year and four year bonuses offered, pre-
sumably using the same weights as BONUS; adjusted to 1990 dollars.
AVGBCOV - Weighted average of the fraction of soldiers eligible for a bonus, pre-
sumably again the same weights as used for BONUS.
BON3 - Average bonus taken by a three year enlistee. Not known whether it
was adjusted to constant 1990 dollars.
COV3 - Fraction of three year enlistees who are eligible for the enlistment
bonus.
BONUS3 - Product BON3xCOV3.
These variables were constant across battalions and changed at most quarterly, especially
at the beginning of the period covered. During the final 27 months covered, BONUS and
AVGBONUS each had 4 different values (shifting at the same times) while AVGBCOV
had only 2 different values (.331 for FY88, .407 for FY89 and the first 3 months of FY90,
missing for the remaining 9 months of FY90, as were the other two variables). Variables
BON3 and COV3 each had three different values during these final 27 months, changing si-
multaneously. In addition, the data set included dummy variables indicating the enlistment
bonus experiment period (July, 1982, through June, 1984), and the type of cell (control,
$8,000 bonus or $4,000/$8,000 option) the battalion fell into for this experiment.
Similarly, the historical data base included several variables describing the educational
benefits available; these included
ACFCOV - Fraction of soldiers eligible for the Army college fund or other educa-
tional benefit.
ACFPV - Present value of educational benefit available at time of enlistment,
assuming three year enlistment, deflated by a cost of college price
index, coastant 1990 dollars.
ACF - Product of the above two variables.
These variables were constant across battalions and changed at most with fiscal year; in
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fact ACFCOV is constant at 0.63 from the start of FY86 through the end of the data
set, while each of the other two take on 3 different values during the final 27 months (a
different value for each fiscal year; for each of these the FY89 value is .936 times the FY88
value and the FY90 value is .936 times the FY89 value). In addition, the data set included
a number of dummy variables associated with educational benefits; these were indicators
for the educational benefit experiment (December, 1980 - September, 1981), for the Army
College Fund with kicker, the Mini GI bill, and the non-contributory VEAP period.
The newly supplied USAREC data indicates 10 different intervals in the 27 months
from October 1987 through December 1989 at which the enlistment bonus structure or
the college benefit structure (or both) changed values. These data were used to construct
equivalent variables to those provided in the historical data base, to the extent possible.
According to this data set, there were no three year enlistment bonuses offered during this
period; however, 4 year, 5 year and 6 year bonuses were offered. Thus the bonus variables
created were based on these three lengths of time, rather than 3 year and 4 year bonuses
as used in the historical data set.
III. Some numerical results
The major dependent variable to be modeled is the number of high quality contracts
written per battalion in a time period. This variable is likely to be influenced by such
internal environmental factors as the high and low quality quotas (or missions), the DEP
losses, and the numbers of low quality contracts produced. The previously mentioned
external environmental factors such as various competing wages available in the civilian
market, cost of living and unemployment variables, the supply of desirable recruits and
how they may be influenced by current attitudes toward the military, educational level,
cultural group, and possibly other variables may also affect the number of high quality
contracts achieved by a particular battalion in a particular time frame. Various production
factors were applied in measured amounts; these include types of advertising, the cadre of
recruiters and monetary incentives (enlistment bonuses, educational benefits).
While awaiting the compilation of the 1988 to 1994 data we organized software and
wrote programs to support the new modeling and tested them using the Berner-Daula data
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set from the decade of the 80's. The model fitting process takes a great deal of exploratory
computation and diagnostic testing.
Generally the new models can achieve high levels of R2
,
the square of the multiple
correlation coefficient. However, we found that model building was unstable using monthly
data. We were advised that we might get greater stability if we used quarterly data vice
monthly data. This proved to be true. This is likely a result of the fact that so many of
the exogenous variables change but quarterly or even less frequently. See Appendix A.
For illustrative purposes, we present some modeling results using quarterly data for
the calculation of elasticities. The model is not polished and there are some diagnostic
weaknesses, but they do exhibit stability in the sense that, generally, minor model changes
lead to but modest changes in the coefficients. Natural logs of all non-dummy variables
were computed; the battalion-month value for each such variable then was centered by
expressing it as the deviation of the log value from the grand mean of its logs over the full
span of months and battalions.
In what follows the endogenous variables are HIGH (number of high quality contracts
signed), QH (high mission or quota), and LOW (number of low quality contracts signed).
The Berner-Daula paper has evidence supporting the possibility that QH is endogenous,
and assumed LOW to also be endogenous. The tables below contain summary information
covering the process. Those variable names ending in Ml have been lagged backwards one
period.
As mentioned earlier, Schmitz [20] provided alternative values for the bonus and edu-
cational variables; the variables ending in _S use his values, rather than the original values
in the historic data set. DEPHI is the label for high quality DEP loss, UNEMP is adult
unemployment, BONUSJS is a measure of the bonus (3-year and 4-year enlistments) avail-
able, BON3.S is the average 3-year bonus taken, BCOV is a weighted average fraction of
enlistees eligible for an enlistment bonus, ACFCOVJ3 is the fraction of enlistees eligible for
the Army college fund or other educational bonus, SBMC is a smoothed version of basic
military compensation, TVAD is the dollar amount spent on national television advertising,
ACFPF.S is the present value of educational benefits available to enlistees, in 1990 dollars,
RECR is the number of active recruiters in the battalion, Ql through Q4 are quarterly
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dummy variables, QMA is the qualified military available, MIN is the minority proportion
of QMA, and YATS is the fraction of the eligible population which looks favorably on the
military as a career. While the data values provided by Schmitz do differ from their coun-
terparts in the historic data set, the ultimate effect on the computed elasticities is quite
minor.
Table 1
Two Stage Least Squares
Dependent variable: HIGH
Valid cases: 1755 Durbin-Watsori: 1.9477
Total SS: 156.8562 Missing cases:
R2 : .86 Degrees of freedom: 1737
Residual SS: 21.9622 Std error of est 0.1124
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic p-Value
DEPHI 0.0637 0.0105 6.0667 0.0000
QH 0.2969 0.0446 6.6591 0.0000
UNEMP 0.2395 0.0220 10.8824 0.0000
BONUS.S -0.0038 0.0017 -2.2458 0.0248
BON3_S 0.0010 0.0107 0.0973 0.9225
BCOV 0.0315 0.0505 0.6250 0.5321
ACFCOV.S -0.2323 0.0473 -4.9068 0.0000
SBMC -0.3696 0.1816 -2.0347 0.0420
TVAD 0.1235 0.0629 1.9634 0.0498
ACFPVJS 0.2141 0.0457 4.6832 0.0000
RECR 0.1946 0.0353 5.5103 0.0000
HIGHM1 0.3316 0.0258 12.8541 0.0000
DEPHIM1 -0.0181 0.0084 -2.1472 0.0319
LOW 0.0575 0.0662 0.8683 0.3853
Ql -0.0102 0.0071 -1.4471 0.1480
Q2 0.0400 0.0061 6.5558 0.0000
Q3 -0.0764 0.0066 -11.4862 0.0000
Q4 0.0466 0.0091 5.1482 0.0000
In the Two Stage Least Squares model described in Table 1, the actual values of the
other endogenous variables (QH and LOW) are not used; instead each endogenous variable
is regressed on a set of exogenous variables, and the fitted values from these regressions are





Valid cases: 1755 Durbin-Watson: 1.9337
Total SS: 201.9052 Missing cases:
R2 : .76 Degrees of freedom: 1745
Residual SS: 47.5165 Std error of est 0.1650
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t- Statistic p-Value
DEPHI 0.0176 0.0094 1.8809 0.0602
DEPHIM1 0.0296 0.0090 3.2737 0.0011
ACFCOV.S -0.0091 0.0023 -3.9523 0.0001
QMA 0.4290 0.0849 5.0523 0.0000
QHM1 0.3994 0.0208 19.1639 0.0000
HIGHM1 0.3742 0.0257 14.5575 0.0000
Qi -0.0795 0.0083 -9.6004 0.0000
Q2 0.0587 0.0080 7.3153 0.0000
Q3 -0.1019 0.0082 -12.3758 0.0000
Q4 0.1225 0.0082 15.0041 0.0000
in Tables 2 and 3.
Even with the quarterly data, some of the elasticities for the benefit variables are
negative; this problem also occurred for the model in [4].
As mentioned in section II, new data on contracts signed and benefits offered has been
provided by USAREC for fiscal years 1988 through 1994. This allows comparison of the
historical values used in [4] with the current best records for the period from October, 1987,
through December, 1989. This new data provided by USAREC generally gives lower values
for contracts produced (of both low and high quality) than are recorded in the historic
data base; see the appendix for more information on the comparison of the two records of
contracts produced.
The USAREC data on benefits offered includes much more detail than the historic data
set. New bonus variables were constructed from this USAREC data, using the descriptions
from the historic data set. These differ considerably from the values used in [4]; the
appendix details the method of construction for these variables.





Valid cases: 1755 Durbin-Watson: 2.0473
Total SS: 113.6493 Missing cases:
R2 : .67 Degrees of freedom: 1743
Residual SS: 37.8863 Std error of est 0.1474
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t- Statistic p-Value
HIGHM1 0.1188 0.0233 5.0972 0.0000
TVAD -0.5601 0.0469 -11.9306 0.0000
RECR 0.2635 0.0411 6.4038 0.0000
MIN -0.0695 0.0975 -0.7126 0.4762
YATS 0.0419 0.0226 1.8515 0.0643
LOWM1 0.4496 0.0202 22.2599 0.0000
NADV 0.6045 0.0525 11.5109 0.0000
UNEMPM1 0.0963 0.0247 3.8962 0.0001
Ql -0.0851 0.0074 -11.5796 0.0000
Q2 0.0943 0.0071 13.2266 0.0000
Q3 -0.0828 0.0073 -11.2747 0.0000
Q4 0.0734 0.0073 10.1120 0.0000
constant at .63 for the final five years worth of data, whereas the Army college fund present
value variable changed with fiscal year and had 3 values in these final 27 months. The
variable constructed from the USAREC data, meant to measure the same coverage, was
based only on the high quality contracts produced; see the appendix for details of its
construction. Since we did not have access to the actuarial rates used to construct the
Army College Fund Present Value variable, no attempt was made to create comparable
values from the USAREC data.
An alternative model proposed by Cornwell et al [6] has been programmed and em-
ployed to investigate elasticities for this 27 month period of overlap between the historic
data set and the newly provided data. This model has the advantage that it presum-
ably allows estimation of (and provides correction for) varying levels of efficiency in use
of resources across battalions. This uses data from both the historic data set and recent
USAREC data. The efficiency factors are captured by individual quadratic time effects
for the battalions. The historic data set included at least partial data for 56 battalions
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over the period October. 1980, through December, 1989; the San Juan battalion data was
not used, reducing the number of battalions to 55. The Fort Monmouth battalion was
disestablished at the end of FY88, having only one year of data for the 27 months stud-
ied; it was also deleted in using this model, leaving 54 battalions with useable data. This
resulted in 54 x 27 = 1458 monthly data values for the model. Allowing for the possibility
of lagging one period (both positively and negatively), the actual number of monthly data
points available is reduced to 54 x 25 = 1350. The numbers of contracts signed, for both
high and low quality recruits, were the recent values provided by USAREC; the variables
for educational benefits and enlistment bonuses were also constructed from this new data
set. The other variables used came from the historic data set.
In modeling the production of high quality contracts over this period, the possible
endogeneity of the high quality goals and the low quality contracts was allowed for by
replacing these variables by instruments to get consistent elasticity estimates; to investigate
the effects of this assumption, the corresponding model using these variables themselves
was also estimated. The following tables present some typical results of this modeling with
the monthly data.
Assuming that QH and LOW are endogenous (Table 4), it would appear that neither
is significant; with neither endogenous, (Table 5) they are both quite significant, but the
sign for LOW is not sensible (increasing the number of low contracts should, if anything,
decrease the number of high contracts produced). In both tables, the proportion of adver-
tising dollars spent on advertising (TVAD/NADV) has a significant negative coefficient,
which is surely incorrect; recall that the various advertising variables change but infre-
quently (and are quite possibly not accurate) in the historical data set; even if the values
are accurate, their crude representation has quite possibly introduced problems of multi-
collinearity, causing inaccuracy in estimation of the coefficient. (The same is true for the
amount spent on advertising NADV.) The coefficients for the remaining variables are at
least plausible; those for the bonus and college fund incentives are positive, with the college
fund coefficient being larger. This relationship holds across a large number of different
particular models which have been fit to this final 27 months of data. Recall that the
recent USAREC data is not in good agreement with the historical data for either bonuses
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Table 4
Cornwell Model - Instruements for QH, LOW
Dependent variable: HIGH (USAREC)
Valid cases: 1350 Durbin-Watson: 1.984
Total SS: 37.636 Missing cases:
R2 : .337 Degrees of freedom: 1336
Residual SS: 24.964 Std error of est: 0.138
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic
QH 0.3713 0.5545 0.670
LOW -0.0463 0.1235 -0.375
DEPHI 0.0341 0.0205 1.661
BCOV(USAREC) 0.4235 0.0836 5.064
ACFCOV(USAREC) 0.5537 0.1495 3.703
RELW 0.0020 0.0017 1.185
TVAD/NADV -0.1065 0.0340 -3.131
NADV 0.1815 0.9703 0.187
RECR 0.4438 0.1105 4.016
HIGHM1 -0.2535 0.0684 -3.708
DEPHIM1 0.0389 0.0439 0.887
Ql -0.0824 0.0933 -0.884
Q2 -0.0373 0.1129 -0.330
Q3 -0.1739 0.0355 -4.905
or educational benefits; the earlier estimated values for these incentive elasticities may be
suspect.
Quarterly models have also been investigated for these 27 months (9 quarters) of data.
Allowing for both negative and positive lags leaves only 7 quarters of data for estimation.
This greatly increases the multicollinearity problem, especially for those variables which
only change yearly like the advertising variables. Generally, the multiple R2 values are
higher for the quarterly mddels; the elasticities for the benefit variables remain sensibly
positive, but many of the exogenous coefficients are quite sensitive to the other variables
included in the model.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
Econometric models are employed to estimate values for idealized economic variables,
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Table 5
Cornwell Model - No Instruments for QH, LOW
Dependent variable: HIGH (USAREC)
Valid cases: 1350 Durbin-Watson: 1.984
Total SS: 37.636 Missing cases:
R 2 : .395 Degrees of freedom: 1336
Residual SS: 22.761 Std error of est: 0.130
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic
QH 0.1021 0.0286 3.575
LOW 0.1948 0.0192 10.169
DEPHI 0.0353 0.0147 2.402
BCOV(USAREC) 0.3118 0.0822 3.796
ACFCOV(USAREC) 0.8372 0.1069 7.832
RELW 0.0016 0.0016 1.005
TVAD/NADV -0.1524 0.0323 -4.715
NADV 1.7922 1.0417 1.720
RECR 0.3543 0.0959 3.696
HIGHM1 -0.2005 0.0260 -7.722
DEPHIM1 0.0436 0.0131 3.319
Ql -0.0287 0.0193 -1.482
Q2 0.0615 0.0289 2.126
Q3 -0.0981 0.0216 -4.545
such as the elasticity of response of one quantity relative to change in a second quantity.
For planning purposes, it would be ideal if USAREC knew the tradeoffs to be realized by
shifting resources between different alternatives. For example, if a certain fixed number
of dollars are available for recruiting a specified number of new enlistees in a given year,
those dollars can be invested in recruiters, various enlistment incentives and in advertising.
The "optimal" split of the available dollars across these various factors depends on the
elasticities of investments made in these different categories; the values of these elasticities
are not known, but can be estimated from observed data (given accurate observed data are
available). These estimated elasticities for the given time period then may be "reasonable"
guesses for the actual elasticity values in future (as yet unobserved) time periods.
Econometric models assume certain relationships between measurable variables and
make assumptions about the "slack" , or measurement error, in the relationships. The stan-
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dard estimation procedures strive to provide consistent estimates (which have desirable
asymptotic or large sample properties) of these economic variables from the observed sam-
ple data. Several military manpower studies ([4], [5], [8], [11], [20]) have employed panel
data in estimation of elasticities of such things as low quality contracts, high quality goals,
relative military pay, unemployment rates, numbers of recruiters, money spent on adver-
tising, enlistment bonuses and educational benefits. These panel data studies involve the
productions of high quality contracts across geographic areas and across several years of
observation. The models employed assume constant elasticities for both these components
(geography and time), an assumption which may be nebulous. Each study also found that
some of the estimates produced were anomolous and opposite in sign from what would be
expected from economic theory. Such anomolies may be attributed to several sources, per-
haps the major ones being weaknesses in the theory (Is the elasticity the same in different
geographic areas and over different years?) or possible errors in the data used. This latter
source can be quite devastating and hard to control or correct.
The historic data set has been used with new models to estimate elasticities of variables
of interest; this has been done on both a monthly and quarterly basis, with the quarterly
models apparently the more stable. In general, the newly suggested model produces similar
results to the switching model in [4] using the historic data set. A review of this data,
however, has shown a number of shortcomings, some of which have been alluded to earlier;
a further discussion is given in the appendix.
In discussing the historic data set with current and recent USAREC personnel, the
variable called high quality goal or mission is rather controversial; it is apparently not well
defined and can shift with time. That is, the goal for battalion B for a given month is
not a stable quantity, it can be (and frequently is) changed for a number of reasons. The
intial recruiting goals for a given year are developed at DCSPER and given to USAREC
well before the start of that fiscal year; the USAREC staff then parcels these requirements
out to the various battalions. Negotiation occurs between USAREC and the battalion
commanders regarding the goals for any given month; the goal typically shifts during this
period. Even after the negotiation period has ended, various "promotions" or adjustments
may be made to the goal file' to implement recruiter awards. (The goal file may be adjusted
15
even after the time period involved has ended.) At this point in time it is not known when
the goal variables were observed (initial suggested values from USAREC or final agreed to
values with battalion commanders or the ultimate value achieved after all adjustments were
made); indeed it is not known if the goal variables were consistently observed with respect
to these possible factors. It is felt that this variable in particular may be quite unreliable
and of doubtful value in modeling production of contracts unless it is brought under better
control.
A number of comments have been made earlier regarding the historic data set; the
appendix has many more. Because it appears this data set may not be very accurate, the
elasticities given in section III should be judged with caution. It is our belief that econo-
metric modelling can and should play a role in resource allocations by USAREC; however,
the worth of estimates produced is highly dependent on the accuracy of the data employed.
USAREC has made great improvements in its data bases and their maintenance over the
last 5 or more years; more variables are now being more accurately tracked. The accessibil-
ity of various classes of data has also been improved. However, the accuracies of data counts
for analytic purposes still (as always) depends on the correct and consistent application of
various filters; this in turn requires skill in programming and intimate knowledge of the
data base structure (which also requires accurate "corporate memory" of the idiosyncracies
which always occur over time). It is our strong recommendation that USAREC devote
resources to review its data base structures, to investigate the use of modern data base
programs, and to develop a cadre of people who are knowledgeable about the data and who
can provide the requisite "corporate memory" for accurate modelling.
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This appendix is arranged in 3 parts. Part A lists the recruiting battalion identifiers for the
historic data set. These identifiers contain an integer followed by a letter. The integer identifies the
brigade to which the battalion reports. Part B gives a description of the historic data set employed
in [4] and lists a number of idiosyncracies which it contains. Part C describes the construction of
the new enlistment bonus and college fund variables from the recent USAREC supplied data.
A. USAREC battalions, October, 1980 — September, 1990
ID Location ID Location
1A Albany 4F Jackson
IB Baltimore 4G Kansas City
1C Boston 4H Little Rock
ID Concord 41 New Orleans
IE Harrisburg 4J Oklahoma City
IF New Haven 4K San Antonio
1G Long Island 5A Chicago
1H Newburgh 5B Cincinnati
11 Ft. Monmouth 5C Cleveland
IK Philadelphia 5D Columbus
1L Pittsburgh 5E Des Moines
IN Syracuse 5F Detroit
3A Atlanta 5H Indianapolis
3B Beckley 51 Lansing
3C Charlotte 5J Milwaukee
3D Columbia 5K Minneapolis
3E Jacksonville 5L Omaha
3F Louisville 5M Peoria
3G Miami 5N St. Louis*
3H Montgomery 6A San Francisco
31 Nashville 6E Honolulu
3J Raleigh 6F Los Angeles
3K Richmond 6G Phoenix
3L San Juan 6H Portland
4A Albuquerque 61 Sacramento
4C Dallas 6J Salt Lake City
4D Denver 6K Santa Anna
4E Houston 6L Seattle
tSt. Louis was 5N for first 84 months,
then 4N for the remaining 36 months.
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B. Historic data set and some idiosyncrasies
The Berner-Daula data base was formatted for 6720 records (56 battalions by 120 months)
containing 145 variables. These 145 variables included battalion designators, a designator for the 120
months, for the fiscal year, for the month names, for the calendar year, as well as dummy variables
for quarters and for months and for other special effects. About 36 of these 145 variables consisted
of actual observed data, some changing monthly, some quarterly, some annually. The remaining
variables in the data set were mostly logs, differences and ratios of these variables, or lagged values
of these variables, with a few contructed in other ways.
The San Juan, Puerto Pdco, battalion was missing values for many variables and was apparently
not used in [4]; we deleted it as well, leaving data for 55 battalions for model useage. Many of
the variables were missing totally for the final 9 months of the period of study (January through
September, 1990), so the actual period covered was the 111 months from October, 1980 through
December, 1989. The Fort Monmouth battalion was retired in October, 1988, and its area of coverage
redistributed to the remaining battalions.
Several of the variable values seem unusual. For instance, the low quality DEP loss values are
for each battalion for each of the first 12 months; the minimum monthly low quality DEP loss value
(across battalions) is constant across the months in each year. This variable is suspect and was not
used. The low quality mission variable alternates monthly between integers and what appear to be
logarithmic values, for each battalion; this variable is not used.
The manufacturing wage variable is available only for the first 78 months (6.5 years) and is
missing for the remainder of the period. Alternative weekly wage variables were constructed several
ways from Current Population Survey data; these have a number of missing values. The youth
unemployment rate is quite unstable and is missing about 10% of its values.
The data describing advertising expenditures is broken into total national expenditures, expen-
ditures for national television, and other than national television; the total exceeds the sum of the
values for television and other than television, perhaps because of special promotions. One variable
is named local advertising; contrary to expectations, this variable does not change with battalion.
It presumably is an indicator of the total amount of local advertising expenditures across battal-
ions. All the advertising values change simultaneously, generally in October and January, otherwise
remaining constant.
Several other variables change with time, but are constant across battalions. Annual goals set
by ADCSPER change annually; the values for basic military compensation change each year but are
not always separated by 12 months. The bonus variables are constant across battalions; these shift
value a total of 18 times in the 111 months, with all changes separated by at least 3 months. The
educational benefit variables are also constant across battalions; the Army College Fund coverage
variable changes only 4 times in the 111 months, and the Army College Fund present value variable
changes 11 times in the 111 months.
The bonus and educational benefit variables are constant across battalions for any given time;
these were described earlier in Section II. The bonus variables contain 19 different values over the
111 months. The Army college fund variable has 12 different values and the Army college fund
present value has 5 different values over the period of the study.
Several variables in the historic data set change values by battalion but are constant over time;
these include the fraction of the population with some college education, the population percent
urban, the population median income and the fraction of the presidential vote in 1980 election which
was Republican. Each of these would provide "scaled" adjustments to the battalion intercept terms
if used; they could prove useful in partitioning battalion areas into homogeneous groups.
Many of the variables change with both battalion and time; these include the basic contract
production values, the missions and the DEP program losses, for both high and low quality recruits.
All of these variables change monthly. The numbers of production recruiters, and the fraction of
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these who have at least nine months experience, change at most quarterly.
The adult unemployment rate changes monthly, the youth unemployment rate changes quar-
terly, throughout the period; the rate for youths changes radically from period to period and may
not be very reliable. The manufacturing wage is available monthly for the first 78 months of the
period (and is missing for the remaining 33 months ). The data set also contains 5 constructed
quarterly series of 17-21 year old weekly wages for the 111 months of the study; these values are
about one third of the manufacturing wage values. Annual values for the numbers of Qualified
Military Available in the population are also given, as are the per cent of these who are minority.
The Youth Attitude Tracking Survey fraction who look favorably on the military for a career are
given annually.
C. USAREC data and the new bonus and educational variables.
USAREC has recently provided data from their Minimaster files on the numbers of contracts
written in fiscal years 1988 through 1994, and on various incentive offers which were available during
this time. The data provided also identified the recruiting station credited with signing each contract;
these were then aggregated to give monthly contract counts for the various battalions. These values
can be compared with the values given in the historic data base of [4] for the period October 1,
1987, through December 31, 1989. San Juan, PR, and Fort Monmouth data are excluded from this
comparison.
There are 54 x 27 = 1458 listed values for both high quality and low quality contracts. The
historic averages (over battalions and months) for numbers of high and low contracts are 94.6 and
65.8, respectively; the same averages for the USAREC data are 84.8 and 61.6. The difference between
the historic data set count of high quality contracts and the more recent USAREC count of high
quality contracts can be evaluated for each of the 1,458 battalion-months; this difference can also be
evaluated for the counts of low quality contracts, as well as the total number of contracts (high plus
low). The battalion-month differences between the historic and USAREC counts, for high quality
contracts, range from —58 to 90, and include 36 zero values; the differences in low quality contracts
range from —35 to 58, with 63 zero values. The differences in total contract production (historic
less USAREC, sum of high and low contracts) vary from —85 to 128 and include 32 zero values.
The historic definitions for the bonus and educational benefit variables are
59. BONUS - ((Sum_i(v_i*cov_i*bon_i))/(Sum_i(w_i))/CPID, where i indexes
three or four year enlistments, w is the percentage of three
(.512) and four (.412) year enlistments over the sample period,
cov is the fraction of enlistees of length i who are eligible
for the bonus, and bon is the (current) dollar amount of the
bonus. CPID is the CPI Deflator, so the values are in constant
1990 dollars.
- Weighted Average Bonus taken
((Sum_i(w_i'«bon_i))/Sum_i(w_i)))/CPID .
- weighted average fraction of soldiers eligible for enlistment
bonus
- ACFPV«ACFC0V
- Present Value of Educational Benefit available at the time of
enlistment, assuming a three year enlistment, followed
immediately by attending college (r=0.3). The present values
are in constant 1990 dollars as deflated by a cost-of -college
price index.
69. ACFCOV - fraction of soldiers eligible for ACF or other educational
benefit
131. B0NUS3 - C0V3*B0N3
132. B0N3 - Average enlistment bonus taken by a three year enlistee
133. C0V3 - Fraction of three year enlistees who are eligible
for the enlistment bonus
As mentioned in Section II, the USAREC data on bonuses and educational benefits is consid-








the USAREC data indicates the existence of only 4-year, 5-year and 6-year enlistment bonuses, with
no 3-year bonuses available. The USAREC data indicates 10 different periods within the 27 months
at which the enlistment bonuses or educational benefits changed in one or more details, as compared
with 4 historic values for BONUS and AVGBONUS, 2 different values for AVGBCOV, and 3 values for B0N3
and C0V3. ACFCQV is constant for the 27 months, ACF and ACFPV take on 3 different values in this
period. The numerical results quoted in Section III. using CornwelFs procedure employed enlistment
bonus and Army college fund variables created from the USAREC data using the above definitions,
except that the bonus variables used were derived from the 4-year, 5-year and 6-year contracts.
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